A Multifaceted Study of the Russian-Ukraine War (2022–•••?) part-1/2

A Multifaceted Study of the Russia- Ukraine War (2022…?)          [Post-4]

---A Complex Mix of Cultural Contestations with the Skewed Geo-political  Ecosystem (Part-1/2)

 1. The Evolution of Concept and Tools of War

      Throughout recorded human history, global peace has consistently been a rare and precious commodity. On the other hand, the occurrences of wars and armed conflicts have raised their bloody fists and ignited all kinds of baser human instincts too often. One analysis indicates that there have been as few as 26 days since the end of World War II (September 1945), when no state was at war with another; that is, the world has enjoyed war-free periods. However, over the years, the nature and the complexion of violent armed conflicts between nations have undergone a sea-change with the incredible advancement in physical transportation and digital wireless communication technologies. The world has indeed become a “global village”. The armed conflict in one part of the world is likely to generate enormous waves or gentle ripples in other parts, depending upon their extant geopolitical alignment, or its absence thereof. One thing is for sure: these days, the definition of a cyber neighbourhood actually transcends national borders. International trade has tied all the continents together in such a way that any prolonged armed engagement, even between just two sovereign states, may seriously disrupt the global supply chains and create significant problems elsewhere in countries with no immediate stake in such conflicts.

    2.  The Russian Annexation of Crimea in 2014

      Any deliberation on the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine that started on February 24, 2022, by Russia, termed as a “Special military operation”, will be abortive for getting to its origin, unless we step back to 1991, when, as an aftermath of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., these units of a confederate became two neighbouring sovereign nations. Going further back into the Soviet era, in 1954, Crimea, then a part of the Russian SFSR in the USSR, was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR to commemorate the union of Russia and Ukraine on the occasion of the historical tercentenary of the union, under the active support of Nikita Khrushchev, the top party leader of the USSR. Not only that, even post-1991-92, barring the initial couple of years, the relations between the two sovereign countries were marked by a meandering course, depending on whether a pro-Russian or an anti-Russian government was in power in Ukraine. However, it was not hotly confrontational for nearly two decades, until the invasion of the Russian armed forces of Crimea in 2014--initially in covert format, only to reveal its official standing within a couple of weeks. But the fact remains that ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been torn between two options— maintaining its camaraderie with Russia and leaning towards Western Europe, seeking membership in the European Union, which would be the first step toward integration with Western Europe. It became apparent that the trust deficit between the two countries had been rising ever since the dissolution of the USSR. Besides, the ethnic population profile of Ukraine was another thorn in the potential cosy relationships between these two nations. Down south in Crimea, the number of the Russian-speaking population is much higher than the Ukrainian one. On the other hand, in the Donbas area, in the eastern part of Ukraine, the population of Russian origin did not outnumber the Ukrainian-speaking one. Still, it is sizable enough to gradually organise armed resistance to the perceived linguistic aggression by the central authority in Kyiv, with the active endorsement of Russia, especially post 2014. 

       However, around 2013, the equation between the two nations had reached a climax, when the pro-Russian government in Ukraine decided to postpone the signing of the protocol that could pave the way for Ukraine to integrate with Western Europe. That caused a huge upsurge in the general public, who rallied in thousands in the main square of the capital city of Kyiv, often called the “Revolution of Dignity” or “Euromaidan”. Around one hundred demonstrators lost their lives in police firing.  The pro-Russian Ukrainian President was forced to flee the country and seek asylum in Russia. The country was in turmoil. At that point, the Russian armed forces, sans the national insignia, captured the parliament of Crimea and, through swift manoeuvring, installed an interim government of their choice, organised a referendum, and ensured the signing of a treaty with the said Crimea government, representing two autonomous regions of Crimea declaring accession to the Russian Federation. The Western world raised a lot of hue and cry, branding the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation a blatant violation of all international laws in place, and the U.N. passed a resolution against Russian action vis-à-vis Crimea. In defence of such charges of gross violation of international protocol, Russia declared that historically, Crimea had been a part of Russia and, in addition to that, it had been incumbent upon the Russian government to preempt the Ukrainian plot to oust the Russian navy from the ports of Crimea in violation of the extant treaty between the two governments to facilitate the advancement of the Western military powers. Besides, it was alleged by them that the government in Kiev was engaged in large-scale repressive acts against the Russian-speaking majority community in Crimea. Russia just played its part to put an end to such nefarious activities once and for all. The referendum (branded illegal by Western powers) to ascertain the will of the people of Crimea, conducted before it acceded to Russia, was cited as a legitimate way of honouring that will. Russia completed the annexation of Crimea into its fold by a rapid operation lasting only three weeks. The Western powers spent tons of sound bites against such a Russian occupation of Crimea, but no bullets. They took the matter to the U.N, but none made any armed intervention to alter the status quo. However, economic sanctions imposed by the US and its Western allies on Russia led to a reduction in GDP growth of 0.5% to 1.5% for Russia.

3.   The immediate cause of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022

      Honestly speaking, it may be averred that, unlike many armed conflicts currently being fought in many parts of the world, no single action or circumstance could be assigned as the last straw on the back of a camel that could have triggered the invasion of Russia into Ukraine as the “special military operation”.Tensions had been building up on both sides of the national borders ever since the occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. On the ground, it was observed that nearly 1,40000  ethnic Ukrainians (mostly Tartars) were squeezed out of Crimea. In contrast, nearly 2,25,000 Russian-speaking people crossed over to Crimea for permanent settlement, many of them being Russian servicemen–serving or retired– with their families. This change in the demographic profile of Crimea consolidated the Russian hold on Crimea, followed by a massive infrastructure development programmes launched worth $10 billion, one of the notable projects being the completion of a bridge spanning kilometres to connect Crimea with Russia by road. In contrast, in the eastern part of Ukraine, having a sizeable chunk of Russian-speaking population had started armed agitations against the government in Kiev for independence, which, according to the Russian version, were being crushed by the use of brutal force, including the use of tanks and air raids. As a result, the Russian-speaking populations of that area have declared two independent states named Donbass and Luhansk. Subsequently, Russia had officially recognised these two states and demanded the withdrawal of all Ukrainian forces from there. With these allegations publicised by Russia, it started its "special military operations" against Ukraine in February 2022. Perhaps Russia was not expecting that much military resilience from Ukraine and had to change its strategy to capture Kyiv at the earliest to cause a regime change, replicating its success with similar action taken in respect of Crimea way back in 1914.

[Image: Coursey- M.S. Co-pilot ]                                                  [To be continued on 11/02/26]

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